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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 930272-CA

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

Priority 15

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(i)(Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.
unique

The trial court did not err when it determined there were
and/or

exception

circumstances

which

warranted

the

distribution of the Defendant's pre-marital property.
This question challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact.
The applicable standard of review is a clearly erroneous standard.
The appellate court may disturb the trial court's Findings of Fact
only if such findings are clearly erroneous.

Haaan v. Hagan, 810

P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991); Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352
(Utah App. 1991). The appellate court should also review the trial
court's

decision

if

in

fact

the

appellate

court

makes

a

determination that the decision is clearly unjust and a clear abuse
of discretion.

Smith v. Smith, 751 P. 2d 1149, 1151 (Utah App.

1988).
II.

The trial court did not err when it did not apply

partnership dissolution rules when it reallocated the Defendant's
pre-marital property after determining that the parties had a
partnership relationship prior to the solemnization of their
marriage.
This question challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact.
The applicable standard of review is a clearly erroneous standard.
The appellate court may disturb the Findings of Fact only if such
findings are clearly erroneous. Haaan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481
(Utah App. 1991); Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App.
1991).

The appellate court should also review the trial court's

decision if in fact the appellate court makes a determination that
the decision is clearly unjust and a clear abuse of discretion.
Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah App. 1988).
III. Respondent is entitled to an award of her reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to Appellant's
appeal?
The award of attorney's fees on appeal is based on the
authority of Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as
a sanction for frivolous appeal.
2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND LAW
The

statutory

law that

is determinative

to

the

issues

presented in this brief are:
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of
the parties and children - Court to have continuing jurisdiction Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious
petition for modification.
(2) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
and parties.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; . . . Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.
33(a) UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court
determines that a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages and
single or double costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the
prevailing party.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the appellate court for the second
time.

The trial court originally ruled that the parties had a

marriage-like relationship on or about January 1, 1980 (R. 99, 103)
(though the marriage was not solemnized until October 5, 1984) and
distributed the property of the parties on the basis that they had
a common law marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5.

(R.

147). The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court to properly
categorize the parties1 property as marital or pre-marital based on
3

the marriage date of October 5, 1984.

(R. 210).

The Court of

Appeals then instructed the trial court to consider whether unique
or exceptional circumstances existed meriting premarital property
to be included in the marital estate.
On

remand,

circumstances"

the

existed

trial

court

allowing

determined

the

court

to

discretion to reallocate pre-marital property.
particular, the

court

determined

that

that

"unique

exercise

its

(R. 231).

In

Plaintiff

had

made

a

substantial contribution to the growth of Defendant's separate
assets.

The Plaintiff helped arrange for and make considerable

improvements to Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was
placed as well as to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing
at the time. Further, Defendant's realty was acquired and improved
during the time of the marriage and prior to the marriage, during
which times the parties were commingling their earnings and
efforts, and as such the court found that said assets were
accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.
233).

(R.

On such basis, the trial court ruled that Plaintiff was

entitled to a reallocation of Defendant's pre-marital property. (R.
232).
There are principally three parcels of real property which are
at issue:

Parcel 1, located in a trailer park at 625 South 50

West, Pleasant Grove, Utah; Parcel 2, located in a trailer park at
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah; and Parcel 3, located at
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
Parcel 1 was acquired by the Defendant on May 27, 1980.
4

Plaintiff

and

her

friends

performed

substantial

labor

and

improvements on the Parcel 1 as well as to the Plaintifffs 1974 72foot Concord mobile home located thereon. Glenda Edwards observed
Plaintiff using a roto-tiller and tractor to prepare the yard for
sod, which roto-tiller and tractor was purchased by Plaintiff.
(Tr. 10, 11). Leo Webber, a friend of Plaintiff, helped put in the
driveway; laid brick around the skirting of the trailer; tore out
the closet and relocated it in the trailer; and made numerous
repairs, all at no charge.

These services were performed as

arranged by Plaintiff and assisted by Plaintiff.
Another

(Tr. 14, 15, 16).

friend of Plaintiff, Lester Freeman, helped

lay two

sections of driveway (Tr. 22) which was accomplished in two pours
with tools provided by Lester Freeman (Tr. 23). Another friend of
Plaintiff, Janice Copes, observed Plaintiff doing yard work which
included sod, flowers and trees on Parcel 1.

(Tr. 26).

Plaintiff herself testified that she personally arranged and
assisted with the following improvements on Parcel 1: sewer; water
and gas lines; helped pour slab under trailer; poured driveway;
assemble out buildings; level ground and put in grass. (Tr. 33).
The improvements were arranged by Plaintiff with the labor being
performed by Plaintiff's friends at no charge. (Tr. 34).

The

Plaintiff also assisted in making substantial improvements to her
own 1974 72-foot Concord mobile home.

The improvements to the

trailer include the following: closet built in living room; sheet
rocking and window change in living room; floor built up in back of
living room; and bar put in living room.
5

(Tr. 35). Plaintiff also

testified that the trailer would be severely damaged, especially in
regards to the closet and sheet rocking, if it were moved from its
present location.

(Tr. 35).

Parcel 2 was acquired in 1985 after the parties were married.
Plaintiff

and her friends performed

improvements on Parcel 2:

the following

labor and

poured pad for mobile home (Tr. 16);

poured driveway; and installed plumbing, water lines and gas lines.
(Tr. 37). All of the work performed by Plaintiff and her friends
was at no charge.

(Tr. 17). Subsequent to the improvements set

forth above, Defendant's 1975 70-foot Brighton mobile home was
relocated on Parcel 2.

Prior to relocation, said mobile home was

used for storage purposes.

(Tr. 37, 38).

Prior to becoming

habitable, Plaintiff cleaned out Defendant's trailer; painted
inside of trailer; and put up siding and painted the siding.

(Tr.

37).
Parcel 3 was purchased by Defendant in August of 1977 with a
down payment of $2,200 with annual payments toward the balance of
$5,800 in amounts of $1,000 each. Defendant made the final payment
for Parcel 3 in the amount of $1,682.15 in 1984 or 1985.
75).

(Tr. 74,

Plaintiff and her friends contributed labor toward the

following improvements on Parcel 3:

cement for floor; laid pipe

and concrete for reinforcing; poured concrete; finished concrete;
and started building the structure.

(Tr. 17). The labor performed

by Plaintiff and her friends was at no cost to Defendant.

The

following services were also performed by Plaintiff in improving
Parcel 3:

backfilling and levelling; laying PVC pipe; mesh and
6

rebar; and organizing work crew to raise building.

(Tr. 39).

The trial court found that Parcels 1 and 3 were Defendant's
pre-marital property, whereas each of the parties1 had a one-half
interest in Parcel 2.

The court then determined that based upon

unique circumstances, the court would exercise its discretion to
reallocate pre-marital property and as such the court awarded
Parcel 1 to the Plaintiff and Parcels 2 and 3 to the Defendant.
On April 21, 1993, the Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal
from the decision rendered by Judge Ray M. Harding.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There

were

unique

and

exceptional

circumstances

which

warranted the trial court in reallocating the Defendant's premarital property.

The facts and circumstances which the trial

court listed were unique and in fact established that Plaintiff in
this case clearly made a substantial contribution to the growth of
Defendantfs separate assets and that the assets were accumulated
and/or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.
The circumstances considered by the court in determining
whether or not unique and exceptional circumstances occurred are as
follows:

whether one spouse has made any contribution for the

growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether the
assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the
parties; amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the
property was acquired before or during the marriage; source of the
property; health of the parties; the parties1 standard of living;
respective financial conditions; needs and earning capacity; the
7

duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; the
parties' ages at the time of marriage and at divorce;

what the

parties gave up by the marriage; and a necessary relationship that
property division has with the amount of alimony and child support
to be awarded; whether on spouse has made any contribution toward
the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether
the aseets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the
parties.
The trial court found that from January of 1980 until the time
the parties were married, the nature of the parties1 relationship
for

all

intents

and

purposes

was

a

partnership.

Because

Defendantfs realty at issue was acquired and improved during the
time in which the parties were commingling their earnings and
efforts, the court found that such assets were accumulated or
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.

The source of the

property was that of purchase by Defendant in each of the cases of
the pre-marital property. However, Plaintiff was also a financial
contributor to the relationship which allowed Defendant the ability
to pool his resources and use for the purchase of said properties.
Were it not for Plaintiff's help however, Defendant would have
needed to use his resources in other manners and would not have
been able to purchase said properties. The term "partnership" was
used

by

the

relationship.

court

to

describe

the

parties'

pre-marital

The court is entitled to look at pre-marital and

post-marital property in making a property distribution. The court
then went on to say that during the time of the beginning of their
8

relationship up until the time of their separation subsequent to
the ceremonial marriage, Plaintiff made substantial contributions
toward the growth of the separate assets of Defendant, which assets
were accumulated and enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.
Based upon Plaintiff's efforts of contributing toward Defendant's
separate assets which were accumulated by the joint efforts of the
parties, the court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to a
distribution of the Defendant's pre-marital property.

As such,

partnership distribution rules are not dispositive and in fact the
partnership relationship was only considered in the larger context
of the contributions made by Plaintiff toward the separate assets
of Defendant before and after the ceremonial marriage.
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of her reasonable attorney's
fees incurred to respond to Appellant's appeal by virtue of Rule
33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in that the court
has established by its specific findings that Plaintiff has made
substantial contributions toward the growth of the separate assets
of Defendant which were accumulated or enhanced by the joint
efforts of the parties.

As such, there has been no abuse of

discretion on the part of the trial court and Defendant's appeal is
frivolous.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WERE UNIQUE AND/OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WARRANTED
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY.
The trial court acknowledged the general rule cited in Haumont
9

v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) which states that
typically, each party is to "retain the separate property he or she
brought into the marriage." At 424. (R. 231).

It further noted

that trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital
property" where "unique circumstances" exist. Id. (R. 231). Such
unique circumstances include those set forth in paragraphs 10A-L of
the court's findings and conclusions signed October 5, 1989, but
are not necessarily limited to those findings.

The court also

considered the following exceptional circumstances outlined in
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) in effectuating an
equitable distribution of the marital and pre-marital property.
The court then went on to find that Defendant's realty at issue was
acquired and improved during the time in which the parties were
commingling their earnings and efforts, and that as such the assets
that are in dispute were accumulated or enhanced by the joint
efforts of the parties.
Both parties derived benefits from their pre- and post-marital
relationship with the other party. The Defendant helped Plaintiff
satisfy debts that Plaintiff brought into the relationship. On the
other hand, Plaintiff allowed the Defendant to live in her trailer,
which was on property that was brought into the marriage, which
trailer was habitable and in excellent condition.

Defendant's

trailer, on the other hand, was uninhabitable when the parties
first met and later became habitable only because of the extensive
work that Plaintiff spent in cleaning and repairing the trailer.
Furthermore, Defendant had a place to stay in town when he returned
10

such that it was not necessary for him to maintain his own trailer.
During the period of time that Defendant was away at work,
Plaintiff

arranged

for

and

made

physical

improvements

to

Defendants realty. A substantial amount of the improvements were
performed by Plaintiff and her friends at no cost to Defendant
except for materials. Furthermore, Plaintiff was expending income
on behalf of the Defendant which allowed the Defendant to use
earnings from his income to be applied towards the materials for
the improvements as well as payments on the parcels of real
property. Otherwise, it would have been necessary for Defendant to
use a substantial amount of his resources to pay the ongoing
expenses that Plaintiff was otherwise satisfying and Defendant
would not have had the resources to pay for materials and payments
on additional parcels of property.
It is evident that the trial court's findings are not
erroneous and that Defendant has not met his burden of establishing
that the findings were

clearly erroneous.

testimony

and

by

Plaintiff

a host

of

There was ample

other witnesses

that

substantial services were performed by Plaintiff and her friends
which substantially improved pre-marital assets of Defendant and
that the parties1 commingled their earnings and efforts to the
benefit of Defendant.

While it is true that Defendant himself

testified contrary, the court chose to believe Plaintiff and her
witnesses as well as the valuations and the evidence supporting
Plaintiff's position and the court's decision.

In any event, the

judge's ruling was not clearly erroneous. The record is clear that
11

there were unique circumstances which warrant the reallocation of
the Defendant's pre-marital property.

The trial court's decision

is clearly just and is most definitely not a clear abuse of
discretion.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DID NOT APPLY PARTNERSHIP
DISSOLUTION RULES WHEN IT REALLOCATED THE DEFENDANT'S PRE-MARITAL
PROPERTY AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE PARTIES HAD A PARTNERSHIP
RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE.
The court found that from January of 1980 until the time of
the parties1 marriage, the parties commingled their earnings and
efforts in such a way as to establish for all intents and purposes
a partnership.

(R. 232). The term "partnership" was used by the

court to describe the relationship between the parties and in
particular the arrangements that they had made in regards to
Plaintiff arranging for and making improvements upon the real
property and mobile homes, and also being responsible for many of
the day-to-day expenses incurred by the parties, with Defendant on
the other hand being responsible for the major expenses such as
purchasing of property and making the ongoing payments as well as
costs of materials for improvements.

At no time did the court

state that the parties had engaged in an official partnership which
would require dissolution at the time of the parties1 marriage. As
set forth above, the Utah Supreme Court determined in Burke v.
Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), that under unique and
exceptional circumstances a court may award property such that one
party would be entitled to an equitable share of pre-marital assets
12

brought

by

the

specifically
Appeals.

other

party

into

the

marriage.

The

court

applied the standards required by the Court of

Defendant's attempt to circumvent the court's ruling by

arguing that partnership dissolution laws should apply to these
parties1

particular

relationship

is an

attempt

to

reap the

substantial benefit derived by Defendant as a result of the
contributions made by Plaintiff toward the growth of the separate
assets of Defendant, which assets were substantially enhanced by
both parties1 efforts.
The parties1 partnership-like relationship prior to their
actual ceremonial marriage is an indication of the joint efforts of
the parties to accumulate and enhance assets that Defendant brought
into

the marriage.

such, the parties1

As

partnership-like

relationship is an exceptional circumstance that the court should
consider in determining an equitable distribution of the marital
and pre-marital property. This was the approach of the trial court
and is not clearly erroneous nor is there an abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, the

Findings

of

Fact

accurately

set

forth the

considerations contemplated by the trial court in the pre-marital,
partnership-like relationship.
The

trial

dissolution

court

rules

when

should

not

have

reallocating

applied

partnership

Defendant's

pre-marital

property. The partnership-like relationship that occurred between
the parties prior to the marriage was correctly considered by the
trial court in establishing whether or not unique circumstances
existed to warrant the reallocation of Defendant's pre-marital
13

property.
POINT III
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER REASONABLE ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED TO RESPOND TO APPELLANTS APPEAL.
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the
court to award attorney fees and costs as a sanction for a
frivolous appeal.
in Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988) this court
ruled sanctions should be imposed for a frivolous appeal when
an appeal is obviously without merit and has been taken
with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results
in delayed implementation of the judgment of the lower
court; increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of
the time and resources of the Law Court, [citation]
Therefore, we award costs and attorney fees on appeal to
[respondent].
The Porco court so ruled

even though

it

"recognize[d] that

sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious
cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal
erroneous lower court decisions."
Likewise, in Fife v. Fife, 777 P.2d 512 (Utah App. 1989) this
court imposed sanctions in the form of attorney fees incurred on
appeal because of frivolous appeals.

Both of these cases were

remanded for a determination of the amount to be awarded.
neither

of

these

cases

was

this

court

concerned

with

In
the

Respondent's need for the award.
Here, Respondent seeks an award of her reasonable attorney
fees incurred in this appeal under Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, as this appeal is frivolous as defined by
14

Porco.

Under this Rule Respondent seeks either the entire amount

of her reasonable fees or such amount as may be determined to have
been incurred for that portion of the appeal that this court find
frivolous, if this court finds the appeal only partially frivolous.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err when it determined that unique
circumstances existed sufficient to warrant the reallocation of
Defendant's pre-marital property. The Plaintiff's contributions of
time, money and work effort, as well as those of her friends, and
Plaintiff's efforts to organize and make arrangements for others to
perform labors at no cost to Defendant greatly enhanced the premarital properties accumulated by Defendant.

There was ample

testimony considered by the court to support this position and as
such the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous nor is
the court's decision unjust or an abuse of discretion.
The trial court concluded that the parties' relationship from
June of 1980 until the time of their marriage was, for all intents
and purposes, a partnership-like relationship. This consideration
was properly applied by the court and considered as a possible
exceptional circumstance to justify reallocation of Defendant's
pre-marital property, rather than using said the partnership-like
relationship to rationalize using partnership dissolution rules.
The Plaintiff asks that the Court of Appeals affirm the trial
court in all respects and that Plaintiff be awarded her reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against the appeal.

15

DATED this 20th day of October, 1993.

DANA D. BURROWS
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of October, 1993, I did
mail two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Robert L.
Moody, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 2525 North Canyon Rd.,
Provo, Utah

84604.

DANA D. BURROWS
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER:

872408

vs .
LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court after defendant's appeal
to the Utah Court of Appeals.

The appellate court has remanded

for this court's further consideration of the division of the
parties' property. Consistent with the appellate court's
decision, this court amends its prior ruling and finds that the
parties' marriage began upon solemnization on October 5, 1984.
Accordingly, parcels of real estate purchased by defendant prior
to that date are deemed pre-marital property.
This Court acknowledges the general rule cited in Haumont v.
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that each party is
typically to "retain the separate property he or she brought into
the marriage."

However, as the Court of Appeals properly noted,

trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital
property" where "unique circumstances" exist.

Id. This Court

finds that unique circumstances exist in this case which warrant
a reallocation of defendant's premarital property so as to grant
the parcel upon which plaintiff's trailer is situated to the
plaintiff as was awarded in this court's original Amended Decree
of Divorce.
Such unique circumstances include those set forth in
paragraph 10(a-l) of the Court's Findings and Conclusions signed
October 5, 1989.

In summary, the Court finds that from January

1980 until the time the parties were married, they commingled
their earnings and efforts in such a way as to establish, for all
intents and purposes, a partnership.

The nature of the parties'

relationship and plaintiff's contributions of time and money to
partnership endeavors entitles plaintiff to a reallocation of
defendant's "premarital property" in the manner described in the
Court's Amended Decree.
After full consideration of the factors suggested in Burke
v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), the Court finds that
unique circumstances exist in this case.

This Court has given

special attention to the factor most emphasized by the Supreme
Court:

"Of particular concern . . . is whether one spouse has

made any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of
the other spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties."

Id.

Plaintiff in

this case clearly made a substantial contribution to the growth
of defendant's separate assets.

As the Court noted in its

Findings and Conclusions, plaintiff helped arrange for and make
considerable improvements to defendant's realty on which her

mobile home was placed and to another parcel that defendant was
purchasing at the time.

Further, because defendant's realty at

issue was acquired and improved during the time in which the
parties were commingling their earnings and efforts, the Court
finds that such assets "were accumulated or enhanced by the joint
efforts of the parties."

Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to

an equitable share of such assets, i.e., she is entitled to the
parcel on which her mobile home was placed.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an order within 15 days
of this decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to
submission to the Court for signature.

This memorandum decision

has no effect until such order is signed by the Court.

Dated this 18th day of December, 1992.

cc:

Dana D. Burrows, Esq.
Robert L. Moody, Esq.

DANA D. BURROWS - 5405
Attorney for Plaintiff
387 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

:

Defendant.

Civil No. CV 87 2408

:

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 23rd day of
September, 1992, pursuant to those issues that were remanded by the
Court of Appeals.
Court's

further

The Appellate Court has remanded for this

consideration

the

division

of

the parties1

property. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented by her
attorney of record, Dana D. Burrows.

Defendant also appeared

personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L.
Moody.
parties

Both parties gave testimony, as did other witnesses. The
each

introduced

several

stipulations into the record.

exhibits

and

stated

their

Being thereby and otherwise fully

apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and filings regarding
this matter, this Court, having taken the matter under advisement
and having issued its Memorandum Decision, now hereby enters the
following:

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Consistent with the Appellate Courtfs decision, this

Court amends its prior ruling and finds that the parties1 marriage
began upon solemnization on October 5, 1984. Accordingly, parcels
of real property purchased by Defendant prior to that date are
deemed premarital property,
2.

This Court acknowledges the general rule cited in Haumont

v, Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that each party
is typically to "retain the separate property he or she brought
into the marriage."

However as the Court of Appeals properly

noted, trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital
property" where "unique circumstances" exist• Id. This Court finds
that unique circumstances exist in this case which warrant a
reallocation of Defendants premarital property so as to grant the
parcel upon which Plaintiff's trailer is situated to the Plaintiff
as was awarded in this Court's original Amended Decree of Divorce.
3.

Such unique circumstances include those set forth below:
A*

The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4

December, 1978.
B.

At the time they met, Plaintiff resided in her

mobile home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 1200
West, Orem, Utah.

Although Defendant's employment

sometimes

required temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided
missile sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when
not on TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her
mobile home.
2

C.

In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own

name, a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At
that same time the parties moved Plaintiff! s mobile home onto that
pad where they continued to cohabit. Defendant paid for the costs
of moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections.
D.

Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the

placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the
realty as her residence.
E.

At

various

assignments, Plaintiff

times

helped

when

arrange

Defendant
for

and

was

on

TDY

make physical

improvements to the Defendant's rdalty on which her mobile home was
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and
situated

at

6072

West

9600

North,

Highland,

Utah.

Such

improvements included the laying of concrete pads at each location,
leveling, laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction
of outbuildings and a metal building.
F*

While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings

toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living
expenses.

Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the

realty.
G.

When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant

was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain
Plaintiff and her daughter.
H.

Defendant made contributions

toward

Plaintiff's

separate debts owed to the I.R.S.,, the Utah State Tax Commission,
3

an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile
accident.
I.

Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor

daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended
school under Defendant's family name of Walters.
J.

Defendant listed his address on his federal and

state income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove,
Utah—the same as Plaintiff's residence—for each of the years
1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983.
K.

Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in

his federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and
1984.
L.

The evidence does not indicate that the parties'

relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage.
4.

Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter

(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove,, Utah, continuously since on or
about May 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary
and secondary

schools servicing that address

for her entire

education and has been and is a Imember of- the local ward of the
church also servicing that address. Prior to May 1980, Plaintiff
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home
4

has been the minorfs only home.
5.

Defendant has been emplqyed as a civilian employee of the

federal government from and since! 1967 through the time of trial.
6.

During the parties1 marriage, Plaintiff has been an

employee of United Stated Steel Corporation except for a period
when her employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was
the location where she was employed.

At the time of the original

trial, Plaintiff had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period
of approximately one year.
7.

As of the date of the original trial Defendant was the

record owner of four parcels of r.ealty, to wit:
A.

Parcel 1 —
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is

located Plaintifffs aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72-foot
Concord.
B.

Parcel 2 —
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is

located a 1975 70-foot Brighton mobile home.
C.

Parcel 3 —
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.

D.

Parcel 4 —
746 West 600 North,, Orem, Utah.

8.

Parcel 1 was deeded to defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel

2 was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract for the purchase of Parcel 3 in July 1977, reciting
5

a down payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward the balance
of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to commence in
June 1978.

Defendant made a final payment for Parcel 3 in the

amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May 1981.

The parties have stipulated

that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem parcel and
that

he

is

listed

as legal owner of

Parcel

4 only

as an

accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable
interests in the property.
any debt.

Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by

Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a

balance as of the date of the original trial in the amount of
approximately $5,000.00.
9*

The Walters' marriage began on October 5, 1984, and as

such all marital property acquired prior to that time is premarital
property of Defendant.

Specifically, Parcels 1, 3 and 4 are

premarital property of Defendant, whereas each of the parties has
a 50% interest in Parcel 2.
10.

The

Court

now

considers

the

following

exceptional

circumstances in effectuating an equitable distribution of the
marital and premarital property:

whether one spouse has made any

contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the other
spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the
joint efforts of the parties; amount and kind of property to be
divided; whether the property was acquired before or during the
marriage; source of the property; health of the parties; the
parties1 standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs
and earning capacity; the duration of the marriage; the children of
6
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the marriage; the parties1 ages at time of marriage and of divorce;
what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary
relationship that property division has with the amount of alimony
and child support to be awarded.
11.

The

court

finds

that

based

upon

the

exceptional

circumstances set forth in paragraph 10 above, that Parcels 1, 3
and 4 were acquired prior to the actual marriage but during the
time period that the parties were actually cohabiting as applied to
Parcels 1 and 3.

It appears that Parcel 4 was purchased prior to

the time that the parties were cohabiting but that payments were
made subsequent to cohabitation.
12.

Plaintiff

in this case

clearly made

a

substantial

contribution to the growth of Defendant's separate assets. As the
Court noted in its Findings and Conclusions, Plaintiff helped
arrange for and make considerable improvements to Defendantf s
realty on which her mobile home was placed and to another parcel
the Defendant was purchasing at the time.

Further, because

Defendant's realty at issue was acquired and improved during the
time in which the parties were commingling their earnings and
efforts, the Court finds that such assets "were accumulated or
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.11
13.

The source of the property was that of the purchase by

Defendant in each of the cases of the premarital properties.
However,

Plaintiff

was

also

a

financial

contributor

to

the

relationship which allowed Defendant the ability to pool his
resources and use for the purchase of said properties. Were it not
7
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for Plaintiff1s help however, Defendant would have needed to use
his resources in other manners and would not have been able to
purchase said properties.
14.
health.

The court finds that each of the parties are in good
The parties each have, standards of living that are

reasonably consistent with that prior to entry into the marriage.
However, Plaintiff was not employed for a period of time at the
request of Defendant which has injured the Plaintiff as it relates
to retirement and the opportunity to purchase items on her own
while the parties were living together but prior to their marriage
which occurred over a period of four to five years.
15.

The parties were married for approximately three years

prior to separation and lived together for a period of seven years
total.

The duration of the marriage was approximately five years

and there are no children of this marriage, though Plaintiff has a
child from a prior marriage who is presently age 16.
16.

Defendant has no child support or alimony obligation to

the Plaintiff and as such the property division is critical because
it is the main asset that remains to be divided.
17.

The court finds that Plaintiff has made substantial

contributions toward the purchase and growth of the separate assets
of Defendant, in particular Parcels 1, 3 and 4 and as such the
value of the properties has been enhanced by the efforts of
Plaintiff.

Specifically,

Plaintiff

during

the

parties1

relationship prior to the marriage was gainfully employed and spent
a substantial portion of her income to provide food and clothing
8

*">

#

-4

for the parties as well
Defendant's vehicle.

as purchase

of

a transmission

for

Plaintiff also purchased a majority of the

tools that were used to improve the properties which had a cost to
the Plaintiff of approximately $500.

Plaintiff also engaged in

physical labor on the properties such as laying the PVC pipe and
wire mesh and rebar for the cement slabs. Plaintiff also acted as
a hod carrier in the brick work that was performed as well as
sheetrocking, taping, sanding and painting the structures.

The

Plaintiff also cleaned and painted the trailer that is awarded to
Defendant and leveled the ground where it is presently located.
Plaintiff also supported Defendant by working in the parties1
residence while they cohabited anjd performed domestic labors that
benefitted Defendant as well. Plaintiff was willing to be engaged
in employment outside of the home but didn't do so at the request
of Defendant.
18.
February

Defendant previously testified at the original trial on
7,

1989, as to

the purchase

prices

and

costs

of

improvements dedicated to parcels, 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of
trial.

The

parties

previously

stipulated

to

this

court's

acceptance into evidence of written appraisals of the parcels
offered by Plaintiff and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a
Certified Review Appraiser. This court considered Mr. Lamoreaux's
assessment of the valuation of the parcels more credible than
Defendant's own assessment for the following reasons:
A*

Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively
9
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on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to
each parcel.
Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and
shopping, existence or nonexistence of public improvements, adverse
easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, insulation,
adequacy

of

storage

and

closets, appeal

and

marketability,

remaining economic life, availability for expansion, comparisons to
recent sale of similar and proximate properties, income potential,
highest and best use, and replacement cost.
B.

Defendant

testified

to

having

no

significant

training or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar
properties.
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he
is a designated

appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage

Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor,
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association.
Upon the foregoing, this court accepts and adopts the
valuations placed ont he properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit:
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home:

$20,000.00

10
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19.

Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home:

$20,000.00

Parcel 3, with improvements:

$10,000.00

With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance

affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for
which either party is liable either jointly or individually.
20.

Defendant now submits additional appraisals stating the

values of Parcel 1 as $24,675.00 and Parcel 2 as $17,500.00.
21.

The court finds that the appraisals by Mr. Lamoreaux have

previously been adopted by the court and that the issue of
valuation of the properties is not in dispute and was not reversed
by the Court of Appeals. As such, the court will not consider the
values set forth in the appraisals by Defendant's most recent
appraiser, but will rather affirm the values as established by Mr.
Lamoreaux.
22.

Each party is entitled to one-half of the other parties1

retirement that accrued from the commencement of the ceremonial
marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce.

Each party shall

cooperate and provide the appropriate information to the other
party

so

that

Qualified

Domestic

Relations

Orders

can

be

implemented to that affect.
23.

Each party should be responsible for their own attorney's

fees and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by
the Court of Appeals.
24.

The

parties

have

stipulated

and

the

judgment

for

11
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Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect, plus
any

accruing

interest.

This

judgment

represents

Defendant's Deseret Bank account and $2,750
America First Thrift account.

$400 from

from Defendant's

Defendant should be awarded the

remainder of each account.
25.

Defendant should be held solely and individually liable

for all debt encumbering, associated with or owing for the realty,
improvements and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the

parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right, title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements—including the mobile home—
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah.

Defendant

should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff.
Defendant should retain all right, title and interests in and to
the parties1 realty and improvements—including the mobile home—
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
Such

division

is

equitable

considering

the

exceptional

circumstances which are considered during the time that the parties
lived together prior to their marriage as well as owing to the time
periods during which such equities were acquired in relation to the
12
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marital

relationship

solemnization

of

that

their

existed
marriage,

between
owing

the
to

parties
the

after

respective

contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the
long-established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of
the monetary values of the properties, owing to the fact that
Plaintiff was a major contributor as to the labor performed and
arranged which improved the properties, owing to the fact that
Plaintiff was employed and provided other necessities for Defendant
which freed up Defendant's income -co make the actual payments on
the properties prior to the parties1 marriage, owing to the age of
the parties and the duration of the marriage and the fact that
Plaintiff gave up substantial earning capacity at the request of
Defendant, owing to the fact that Defendant has no alimony or child
support obligation to the Plaintiff and that the real property is
the only remaining assets to be divided and owing to the fact that
Plaintifff s contributions toward the growth of Defendant! s separate
property vastly enhanced the value of said properties.
2.

Defendant should be held solely and individually liable

for all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty,
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah.

Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless

therefrom.
3.

Each party is awarded a one-half interest in the other
13

24

party's retirement that accumulated from the date of the parties'
ceremonial marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce,

Both

parties shall cooperate and provide the necessary information to
the other parties so that Qualified Domestic Relations Orders may
be implemented.
4.

Each party is responsible for their own attorney's fees

and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by the
Court of Appeals.
5.

The

parties

have

stipulated

and

the

judgment

for

Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect, plus
any

accruing

interest.

This

judgment

represents

$400

from

Defendant's Deseret Bank account and $2,750 from Defendant's
America First Thrift account.

Defendant should be awarded the

remainder of each account.
APPROVAL AS TO FORM

ROBERT L. MOODY
DATED this J%3

day ofJMarph7^1993.
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4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the-foregoing
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
"S
day of
March, 1993.
Robert L. Moody
2525 North Canyon Rd.
Provo, UT 84604

DANA D. BURROWS
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DANA D. BURROWS - 5405
Attorney for Plaintiff
387 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

ORDER AMENDING DECREE OF
DIVORCE

:

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

:

Defendant.

Civil No. CV 87 2408

:

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 23rd day of
September, 1992, pursuant to those issues that were remanded by the
Court of Appeals.
Court's

further

The Appellate Court has remanded for this

consideration

the

division

of

the parties'

property. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented by her
attorney of record, Dana D. Burrows.

Defendant also appeared

personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L.
Moody.
parties

Both parties gave testimony, as did other witnesses.
each

introduced

several

stipulations into the record.

exhibits

and

stated

The

their

Being thereby and otherwise fully

apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and filings regarding
this matter, this Court, having taken the matter under advisement
and having issued its Memorandum Decision, and having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters the following
Order Amending the Decree of Divorce:
1
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1.

A Decree of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was

entered on October 5, 1989.
2.

The Defendant having appealed several of the issues to

the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals having rendered a
ruling and having remanded to this Court for further consideration
of the division of personal property:
A.

Plaintiff shall be awarded as her equitable share of

the parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right, title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements—including the mobile home—
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant is
ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff.
B.

Defendant

shall

retain

all

right,

title

and

interests in and to the parties1 realty and improvements—including
the mobile home—situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove,
Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600
North, Highland, Utah.
C.

Such

division

is

equitable

considering

the

exceptional circumstances which are considered during the time that
the parties lived together prior to their marriage as well as owing
to the time periods during which such equities were acquired in
relation to the marital relationship that existed between the
parties after solemnization of their marriage, owing to the
respective contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the
properties by each party, owing to the fact that such division
preserves the long-established residence of Plaintiff and her minor
2
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daughter as well as the minor's school and religious associations,
and owing to the fact that such division approximates a near equal
division of the monetary values of the properties, owing to the
fact that Plaintiff was a major contributor as to the labor
performed and arranged which improved the properties, owing to the
fact that Plaintiff was employed and provided other necessities for
Defendant which freed up Defendant's income to make the actual
payments on the properties prior to the parties1 marriage, owing to
the age of the parties and the duration of the marriage and the
fact that Plaintiff gave up substantial earning capacity at the
request of Defendant, owing to the fact that Defendant has no
alimony or child support obligation to the Plaintiff and that the
real property is the only remaining assets to be divided and owing
to the fact that Plaintiff's contributions toward the growth of
Defendant's separate property vastly enhanced the value of said
properties.
3.

Defendant shall be held solely and individually liable

for all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty,
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah,

Defendant shall hold Plaintiff harmless

therefrom.
4.

Each party is awarded a one-half interest in the other

party's retirement that accumulated from the date of the parties'
ceremonial marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce.

Both

parties shall cooperate and provide the necessary information to
the other parties so that Qualified Domestic Relations Orders may
3
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be implemented*
5.

Each party is responsible for their own attorney's fees

and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by the
Court of Appeals.
6.

The

parties

have

stipulated

and

the

judgment

for

Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect.
This judgment represents $400 from Defendant's Deseret Bank account
and

$2,750

from

Defendant's

America

First

Thrift

account.

Defendant should be awarded the remainder of each account.
APPROVAL AS TO FORM

ROBERT L. MOODY
DATED this ^ 3

day o

Jlffi€£-RAY M. HARDING
4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy Q £ thgl^orego-incf
was mailed
h i993 to the following, postage prepaid, this°v:V»J> wday of
March

'

-

*<z^&?y

Robert L. Moody
2525 North Canyon Rd.
Provo, UT 84604
^^W^v^rDANA D. BURROWS
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

Ss?

"c f

•••**••**•**•****•***

HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

-vs-

CV 87 2408

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

************••*•*••••

The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement,
will rule at this time.
The Court finds that the parties in this action are
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party.
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when
the marital relationship between the parties began. The Court
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about
January 1, 1980, which was several years before the marriage was
actually solemnized.
The Court considered a number of factors in determining
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among these is the
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintiff's trailer with
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the
plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and
did not charge rent.
The plaintiff made improvements on the

1
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property such as would be expected of a married couple.
The
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission.
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state,
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January
1st, 1980.
This is an approximate date because the Court does
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date.
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff is
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the
defendant retires.
If for any reason the defendant does not
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff.
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator
consists of the number of years or months they were married
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government
and the denominator is the total number of years or months
defendant was in such employment."
Marchant, at 206.
The
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires. If
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they
may wish to consider a cash settlement of the retirement
benefits.

2

The real property which is at issue was partially
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for,
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the
real property.
The plaintiff is to receive the property in
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear.
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove property
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that
property.
The Court finds that this is a fair division of the
property which was either acquired or paid for during the
marriage.
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those.
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account,
and $2750.00 of the America First account.
The Court has no evidence of values with which to
divide the disputed personal property of the parties..
The
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a
division of property between themselves, or having one party
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and
the proceeds divided.
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees
upon submission of affidavits by counsel.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the
Court for signature.
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Dated this 15th day of February, 1989
BY

cc:

Robert L. Moody, Esq.
Thomas H. Means, Esq.
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222
Attorney for Plaintiff
363 North University Avenue
Suite 103
P.O. BOX 2283
Provo, Utah, 84603
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

]
;|

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]|

NO. CV 87 2408

V

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L.
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter,
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter
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under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now
hereby enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior
thereto.
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 October, 1984, in
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 197 6, who
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short
period when Plaintifffs mobile home was situated at 155 South 12 00
West, Orem, Utah.
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist.
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on
or about 10 November, 1987.
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or
about May, 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home
has been the minor's only home.
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial.
8. During the parties' marriage Plaintiff has been an employee
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately
one year.
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either
in the form alimony or child support.
3

10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized.
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated.
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports
such finding is as follows:
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4
December, 1978.
b. At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 12 00 West,
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile
home.
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name,
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that
4
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same time the parties moved Plaintiff's mobile home onto that pad
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections.
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the
realty as her residence.
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling,
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of outbuildings and a metal building.
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the
realty.
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain
Plaintiff and her daughter.
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h. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission,
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile
accident.
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended
school under Defendant's family name of Walters.
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state
income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980,
1981, 1982, and 1983.
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and
1984.
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties'
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage.
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00.
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether
6
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these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account.
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of
four parcels of realty, to wit:
a. Parcel 1625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot
Concord.
b. Parcel 264 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home.
c. Parcel 36072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
d. Parcel 4746 West 600 North, Orem,. Utah
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977,
7
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reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately
$5,000.00.
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Court's acceptance into
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser.
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreauxfs assessment of the valuations
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for
the following reasons:
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to
each parcel.
8

Mr, Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements,
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout,
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion,
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties,
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost.
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties,
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor,
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association.
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit:
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home:
9

$20,000.00

Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home:

$20,000.00

Parcel 3, with improvements:

$10,000.00

15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of the retirement
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant. 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App
1987) . The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant
was in such employment."
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for
which either party is liable either jointly or individually.
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980
Chrysler automobile.
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties' 1979
Chevrolet pick-up truck.
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as
opposed to property accumulated during the parties1 marital
relationship.

11
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20. Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000.00
for attorney's fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint.
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees.

12

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her
marriage to Defendant.
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his
marriage to Plaintiff.
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other.
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty
situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow.
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987.
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150*00 representing $400*00
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the
remainder of each account.
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7. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff.
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship
that existed between the parties both prior to and after
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as
well as the minorfs school and religious associations, and owing to
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of
the monitory values of the properties.
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty,
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West,
14

Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile.
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate
property the parties' 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck.
11. It is proper that the parties1 personalty as noted in
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds
therefrom divided equally between them.
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v
Marchant. 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff's proportionate share
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter,
15

(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement,
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction.
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth
hereinabove.
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00.
Dated this y

day of Jtegwb, 1989.

Approved as to form:
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222
Attorney for Plaintiff
3 63 North UniversitySuite 103
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84 603
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,
v

AMENDED
;I DECREE OF DIVORCE
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LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.
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This matter, having come on regularly for trial on the 7th day
of February, 1989, and this Court, having taken the matter under
advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, and having
entered its written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving
her marriage to Defendant.
2. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving
his marriage to Plaintiff.
3. Each party is hereby held solely and individually liable
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after
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the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. Each party shall
hold the other harmless for any and all such debts incurred in
his/her individual name after 10 November, 1987.
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing a
$400.00 share of Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and a $2750.00
share of Defendant's America First Thrift account. Defendant is
hereby awarded the remainder of each account.
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the
parties' equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. More
particularly described as:
Lot 9, Plat D, Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates
Defendant is hereby ordered to deed and deliver such realty to
Plaintiff.
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant retain all right,
title, and interests in and to the parties' realty and improvements
- including the mobile home - situated at 64 0 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
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7. Defendant shall be and is hereby held solely and
individually liable for all debt encumbering, associated with, or
owing for the realty, improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0
South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant shall hold Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile.
9. Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate
property, the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck.
10. It is hereby ordered that the parties1 personalty as noted
in their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and
accepted as evidence by this Court - but excepting the
aforementioned automobiles and mobile homes - be marshalled, sold,
and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties.
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his
employment with the federal government during the marital
relationship, which is and shall consist of one half (50%) of the
total amount of all of Defendant's monthly benefit payments
multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the
denominator is the total number of months Defendant is employed by
the federal government. The fraction shall be determined at such
time as Defendant shall retire. Plaintiff shall not receive her
3

share of such benefits until Defendant retires. If Defendant
separates from civil service in advance of retirement and withdraws
his contributions, Plaintiff shall receive a portion of such refund
based on the above-noted fraction. If for any reason, Defendant
does not qualify for such benefits, neither will Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is hereby granted and awarded such proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits as well as a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order setting forth her rights in
Defendant's retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth
hereinabove and hereby granted and awarded to her,
12. Plaintiff is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby
ordered to pay as and for Plaintiff!s reasonable attorney's fees
the sum of $1000.00.

/J

,

Dated this ^7<->f_ day of Auguot, 1989,

Ra*
Ju^e^
Fourth Judicial Distric
Utah County
Approved as to form:

